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Abstract
We solve for the case of one-sided network formation and show that all Nash equilibrium
networks are again nested split graphs.
1 Model Description
The one-sided speciﬁcation diﬀers from the two-sided model in that, in order for a pair of agents
to beneﬁt from each other's eﬀort level, only one agent needs to extend a link (and bear the cost).
This allows us to use Nash equilibrium as equilibrium concept. Note that under pairwise Nash
equilibrium pairs of agents can create only one link at a time and both agents may adjust their
eﬀort levels. Under Nash equilibrium we consider deviations where an agent may extend multiple
links (and simultaneously delete any subset of existing ones), but only the (single) deviating agent
may adjust eﬀort levels. Note that, since the respective other agent in a deviation now does not
alter his eﬀort level, we now need strict convexity of the value function for our characterization
to go through.
Let again N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players with n ≥ 3. As before, each player i
chooses a personal eﬀort level xi ∈ X and a set of links, which are represented as a row vector
gi = (gi,1,..., gii−1, gii+1,..., gin), where gij ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ N\{i}. Assume X = [0,+∞) and
gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1. The set of strategies of i is denoted by Si = X×Gi and the set of strategies of
all players by S = S1×S2×...×Sn. A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) ∈ S again speciﬁes the individual
eﬀort level of each player, x = (x1,x2,..., xn), and a set of links g = (g1,g2, ...,gn). Agent i is said
to sustain or extend a link to j if gi,j = 1 and to receive a link from j if gj,i = 1. The network of
relations g is a directed graph, i.e. it is possible that gi,j 6= gj,i. Let Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gi,j = 1}
be the set of agents i has extended a link to and deﬁne ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|. Call again the closure
of g an undirected network, which we denote by g¯ =cl(g), where g¯i,j = max{gi,j, gj,i} for each i
and j in N . Denote by Ni(g¯) ={j ∈ N : g¯i,j = 1} the set of players that are directly connected
to i in g¯. The eﬀort level of i's direct neighbors can then be written as yi(g¯) =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. We
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will drop the subscript of yi when it is clear from the context. The network is said to be empty
and denoted by g¯e if g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N and complete and denoted by g¯c if g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ N .
Payoﬀs of player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) are given by
Πi(s) = pii(x,g)− ηi(g)κ,
where κ denotes the cost of extending a link. The assumptions on the payoﬀ function are as
in the one-sided speciﬁcation.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle s∗=(x∗,g∗) such that
Πi(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N .
2 Equilibrium Characterization
We only present the corresponding result for Theorem 1 of the main part of the paper, namely
that all Nash networks are nested split graphs. This model is solved in a previous working paper
version (Hiller, 2013). Lemma 1 (OA) shows that there can be only one directed link between
any two agents.
Lemma 1 (OA): In any NE, (x,g), there is at most one directed link between any pair of
agents i, j ∈ N .
Proof. Assume that (x,g) is a Nash equilibrium and that gi,j = gj,i = 1. But then i can
proﬁtably deviate by cutting the link to j such that gi,j = 0. Gross payoﬀs remain unchanged,
while i's linking total cost decrease by κ. Q.E.D.
In Lemma 2 (OA) we show that in any Nash equilibrium if i extends a link to l, then i must
also be connected to agent k for any k such that xk ≥ xl. Note that we do not require that i
extends a link to k, but only that i and k are connected. That is, it may be agent k extending
the link to agent i.
Lemma 2 (OA): In any NE, (x,g), if gi,l = 1 then g¯i,k = 1 ∀k : xk ≥ xl.
Proof. For gi,j = 1 to be part of a NE it must be that v(yi(g¯))− v(yi(g¯)− xl) ≥ κ. Assume
contrary to the above statement that g¯i,k = 0 for some k with xk ≥ xl. This, however, cannot
be a NE since i then ﬁnds it proﬁtable to extend a link to agent k. To see this, note that
v(yi(g¯) + xk) − v(yi(g¯)) > v(yi(g¯)) − v(yi(g¯) − xl) ≥ κ, where the inequalities follow from the
convexity of the value function. We have reached a contradiction and therefore g¯i,k = 1 for all
agents k with xk ≥ xl. Q.E.D.
The following lemma shows that if i extends a link to l, then any agent k with a higher or
equal eﬀort level than i must also be connected to l. Again this follows from the convexity of
the value function.
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Lemma 3 (OA): In any NE, (x,g), if gi,l = 1 then g¯k,l = 1 ∀k : xk ≥ xi.
Proof. For gi,j = 1 to be part of a NE, it must be that v(yi(g¯)) − v(yi(g¯) − xl) ≥ κ.
Assume contrary to the above statement that g¯k,l = 0 for some k with xk ≥ xi. Note next that
for xk ≥ xi to hold we must have yk(g¯) ≥ yi(g¯), which follows directly from strict strategic
complementarities. Therefore, v(yk(g¯) + xl)− v(yk(g¯)) > v(yi(g¯))− v(yi(g¯)− xl) ≥ κ, where the
inequalities follow from the convexity of the value function. We have reached a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
The following Lemma shows that in any Nash equilibrium if a pair of agents exert same eﬀort
levels, then they must share the same neighborhoods. The proof is a direct consequence of the
convexity of the value function.
Lemma 4 (OA): In any NE, (x,g), xi = xk ⇔ Ni(g¯) \ {k} = Nk(g¯) \ {i}.
Proof. First we show that Ni(g¯)\{k} = Nk(g¯)\{i} ⇒ xi = xk. If g¯i,k = 0, then yi(g¯) = yk(g¯)
and therefore xi = xk. Assume next that g¯i,k = 1 and without loss of generality that xi > xk.
But then yi(g¯) < yk(g¯) and we have reached a contradiction. Next we show that xi = xk ⇒
Ni(g¯) \ {k} = Nk(g¯) \ {i}. Assume to the contrary that xi = xk and Ni(g¯) \ {k} 6= Nk(g¯) \ {i}.
Note that for xi = xk to hold it must be that yi(g¯) = yk(g¯). For Ni(g¯) \ {k} 6= Nk(g¯) \ {i} to
hold, there must exist an agent l such that l ∈ Nk(g¯) and l /∈ Ni(g¯). For the link g¯k,l = 1 to be
in place in g¯ we must have that v(yk(g¯) − v(yk(g¯) − xl) ≥ κ. But from yi(g¯) = yk(g¯) and the
convexity of the value function v(yi(g¯) +xl)− v(yk(g¯)) > v(yk(g¯))− v(yk(g¯)−xl) ≥ κ holds and
we reach a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 (OA) shows that in any Nash equilibrium if an agent i exerts a weakly lower eﬀort
level than another agent k, then agent i's neighborhood is contained in k's neighborhood.
Lemma 5 (OA): In any NE, (x,g), xi ≤ xk ⇔ Ni(g¯) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯) \ {i}.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that Ni(g¯)\{k} ⊆ Nk(g¯)\{i} ⇒ xi ≤ xk. If g¯i,k = 0, then yi(g¯) ≤ yk(g¯)
and therefore xi ≤ xk. Assume next that g¯i,k = 1 and xi > xk holds. But then yi(g¯) < yk(g¯)
and we have reached a contradiction. Next we show that xi ≤ xk ⇒ Ni(g¯) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯) \ {i}.
Assume to the contrary that xi ≤ xk and there exists an agent l such that l ∈ Ni(g¯) and
l /∈ Nk(g¯). For the link g¯i,l = 1 to be in place in g¯ either gi,l = 1 or gl,i = 1. If gi,l = 1, then
v(yi(g¯))− v(yi(g¯)−xl) ≥ κ must hold. But from yi ≤ yk and the convexity of the value function
we can write v(yk(g¯) + xl) − v(yk(g¯)) > v(yi(g¯)) − v(yi(g¯) − xl) ≥ κ and we have reached a
contradiction. We can apply an analogous argument for gl,i = 1. Q.E.D.
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In Theorem 1 (OA) we show that all Nash equilibria are nested split graphs.
Theorem 1 (OA): In any NE, the network g is a nested split graph.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that the complete and the empty network are nested split graphs. We start
by showing that in any NE if ηk(g¯) ≥ ηl(g¯), then xk ≥ xl. Assume to the contrary that xl > xk.
We distinguish two cases. Consider ﬁrst the case that ηk(g¯) > ηl(g¯) holds. Then there exists an
agent m ∈ Nk(g¯) and m /∈ Nl(g¯). We consider two subcases. Assume ﬁrst that agent m extends
a link to k and gm,k = 1. But then, by xl > xk and Lemma 2 (OA), g¯m,l = 1 and we have
reached a contradiction. Next assume that agent k extends a link to m and gk,m = 1. But then,
by Lemma 3 (OA), g¯l,m = 1 must hold and we have reached a contradiction. Assume next that
ηk(g¯) = η(g¯). We distinguish two cases. If Nk(g¯) \ {l} = Nl(g¯) \ {k}, then xk = xl by Lemma
4 (OA) and we have reached a contradiction. If Nk(g¯) \ {l} 6= Nl(g¯) \ {k}, then there exists an
agent m ∈ Nk(g¯) \ {l} and m /∈ Nl(g¯) \ {k}. The argument that m ∈ Nl(g¯) \ {k} must hold is
analogous to the previous case. We have established that in any NE if ηk(g¯) ≥ ηl(g¯) holds, then
xk ≥ xl also holds. Next we show that in any NE if g¯i,l = 1 and ηk(g¯) ≥ ηl(g¯) (and therefore
xk ≥ xl), then g¯i,k = 1. We distinguish two cases. We ﬁrst assume gi,l = 1. Then by Lemma 2
(OA) g¯i,k = 1 holds. Assume next that gl,i = 1. Then by Lemma 3 (OA) g¯i,k = 1. That is, g¯ is
a nested split graph. Q.E.D.
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